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The tendency in recent Schelling studies has been toward
massive, all-encompassing interpretations, e.g. Harold Holz'
Spekulation und Faktizität, J.-P. Marquet's Liberté et existence, and M.
Veto's Le Fondement selon Schelling. Werner Marx, in the three essays
collected here, chooses to focus on two important turning points in
Schelling's speculative career — the System of Transcendental
Idealism of 1800 and the 1809 Essay on Human Freedom. The narrow
focus is motivated not by historical interest alone, but by Marx's
assessment of the situation of philosophy today. Says Marx,
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It would in fact be false to deny that the traditional foundation
upon which Schelling's project rests can no longer basically
correspond to our contemporary historical consciousness and to
the altered vision of man and the world brought about by the
domination of technology. But what foundation, then, is
authoritative for our present-day thought, both for philosophy
and science and for our everyday actions? Is such a foundation
yet conceived? It is, I contend, the particular fate of our
generation to live between the tradition and the beginning of a
new foundation, to live in a time in which the old categories of
knowledge and the old standards of ethical action weaken and
disappear, in an age in which as yet no new foundation has
appeared (pp. 13-14).
Marx looks back to Schelling as a philosopher who thinks from, and
consequently stands as a representative of, the tradition. These
studies embody a nostalgia for the tradition, for Marx thinks that —
whether our task be theory of history or practical philosophy or the
attempt to provide any speculative or scientific account with
systematic foundation — we necessarily lack the certainty Schelling's
thought possessed, i.e. we lack the secure foundation of an Absolute
and find the theological presuppositions that helped us make sense of
history and human action and provided the closure and finality of
systematic knowledge all discredited.
The first essay, "Grundbegriffe der Geschichtesauffassung bei
Schelling und Habermas," contrasts the explicit teleological, indeed
theological, foundations of the theory of history found in Schelling's
1800 System with the problematic, and apparently unfounded,
teleology of Habermas' vision of history in Erkenntnis und Interesse.
Schelling sees history as an objectification of the will, indeed its
highest grade of objectification, where its rationality is no longer
obscured by the arbitrary nature of individuals' acts. "History," he
says, "is there only where one ideal is realized through infinitely many
variations, and realized so that not only the particular but indeed the
totality come into congruence with it (3:588)." This one ideal is the
concept of a world-order wherein freedom, the essence of selfconsciousness, would be realized in a thoroughly law-like manner.
Schelling calls this world-state a "second and higher nature," meaning
by 'nature' something like a mechanica order, wherein things are
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governed by necessity and not by caprice. Since Schelling contends
that freedom can be maintained and enhanced only when supported
by such an order of necessity, we can see that his notion of history as
a tendency moving to bring human events into a universal world-order
brings the concepts of freedom and necessity into an absolute
contradiction. And yet there is the demand that these be made one
and harmonized.
Marx observes that the task of solving the contradiction
between human freedom and natural necessity pervades Schelling's
thought in all stages and is its great systematic theme. In 1800 he
solves the freedom-necessity problem in the following way: Since the
whole of the (philosophically reconstructed) world of the Self stems
from a dialectical interplay of unconscious productivity and conscious
or reflective appropriation thereof, the togetherness of unconscious act
and conscious recognition must be established definitively in a 'highest
synthesis,' which of course overreaches ordinary consciousness. This
synthesis binds together freedom and necessity and integrates the will
of individual agents into the world-historical teleological process. The
1800 System, setting out to think the ground of the law-like character
of freedom and the freedom or spontaneity of the lawfulness of nature
from both sides, thus arrives at their necessary identity, and with the
postulation of this identity takes on a metaphysical or indeed
theological character. Marx notes that for religion such a complete
synthesis is nothing other than God and that, therefore, Schelling's
theory of history has explicitly theological presuppositions, whether or
not Schelling in 1800 would state them in the language religion
traditionally uses.
Marx is hardly critical of this teleological and theological
foundation for the System, but he is critical of the work's failure to
harmonize the postulated absolute synthesis of freedom and necessity
with any meaningful sense of human freedom. As Marx rightly sees,
Schelling's system is vitiated by an irreconcilable contradiction. The
system is supposed to be founded on freedom and as a whole to be
nothing other than the outworking of freedom as productivity and as
coming-to-consciousness, yet it ends up a system of blind necessity,
wherein the rationality of human agency is in fact denied. It is not until
the 1809 freedom essay that Schelling attempts to think through in a
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more profound and reflective way a possible harmonization of human
freedom and rationality with the freedom/necessity of the Absolute.
Marx then turns his attention to Jürgen Habermas' view of
history. Habermas' theory is expounded from a Marxian basis, where
in history is seen as the process of human self-production. Selfproduction,' however, is given a radically non-Marxian interpretation,
i.e. an epistemological and transcendental one, in that Habermas
contends that work indeed transforms nature for human use, but that
the crucial element in such transformation is reflection or the power of
reason. Man not only makes himself through praxis, but through
rational praxis. Marx comments that with this granting of an
independent status to reflection as the motor of history's evolution
toward the 'emancipated society,' Habermas' theory becomes explicitly
teleological. The problem, though, is to ground or in some sense
explain this teleological orientation of reflection toward human
emancipation, fir the theological presuppositions that undergird a
theory of history such as Schelling's have been totally discredited.
Marx observes that Habermas' notion of reflection is deeply
confused. (1) The concept of reflection does not sort well with the
basic Marxian view of history Habermas espouses. Reflection is
plausibly located within class-consciousness, but Habermas neglects to
explain the possible transition between work on the material basis to
the emergence of reflective consciousness. (2) Habermas borrows his
concept of reflection from Hegel, but the kind of reflection he has in
mind lacks the sceptical or negatively self-related character of
Hegelian consciousness. (3) What dimension of human spirituality or
transcendence that Habermas introduces into his theory by turning to
Hegel for the concept of reflection if vitiated by his turning to Freudian
psychotherapy for a working-model of reflection. Taking
psychotherapy as the model of the rational dialogue that can go on
within a society, Habermas actually limits the role of human reflection,
and certainly of human freedom. Marx argues that there is something
deeply contradictory in Habermas' adoption of reflection as the motor
of historical development, something deeply ungrounded in a
teleological view of history that has cut itself off from theological
presuppositions. Marx finds in Habermas, "the dilemma of a theory of
history that indeed implicitly pursues its pattern in a teleological
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manner while wishing to overcome teleology, yet being unable to set it
aside" (p.62).
In his second essay, "Aufgabe und Methode der Philosophie in
Schelling‘s System des transzendentale Idealismus und in Hegel‘s
Phänomenologie des Geistes," Marx compares the systematic
standpoints of Schelling in 1800 and of Hegel in 1807. His supposition
is that the two works are parallel and differ only in the way they seek
to solve a commonly held vision of the task of philosophy, enunciated
by Hegel in the Differzschrift as "die Aufhebung der Entzweiung" — the
resolution of dichotomies common to ordinary consciousness and
traditional philosophy alike, oppositions between subjectivity and
objectivity, between reason and ethical activity, between intelligence
and nature. Marx seeks to vindicate Schelling's central systemconcept, intellectual intuition, and to show that, despite the polemics
Hegel introduced into the Phenomenology's 'Preface,' it is as adequate
a system-principle as Hegel's own reflection.
Marx begins by noting that despite differences in detail and
vigorous polemical discussions, Fichte, the young Schelling and Hegel
are in agreement: Philosophy as Wissenschaft is made possible by,
and founded upon, that dimension of freedom found in finite selfconsciousness. That freedom is represented in the System precisely by
the notion of intellectual intuition, for therein Schelling claimed, "the
beginning and end of this philosophy is freedom, the absolute
indemonstrable, that which can be proven only through itself" (3:376).
Packed into the concept of intellectual intuition, claims Marx, are the
notions of freedom, productivity, spontaneity, and self certification.
Marx acutely observes that behind the concept of intellectual
intuition in the 1800 System is Schelling's conviction that there is a
pre-reflexive, spontaneous and productive side of reason — in other
words, reason is operative in, and constitutive of, the world at a level
that is beyond the comprehension of ordinary consciousness.
Accordingly the System calls all pre-conscious and constitutive acts
'acts of intuition' and organizes its systematization of human
knowledge as a progressive coming-to-consciousness of these
preconscious productive acts. Schelling conceives intellectual intuition
as simultaneously the power to posit itself and the power to limit itself.
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It is an identity of opposites, but always a synthetic identity; within
self-intuition (and self constitution) there is always a duplicity, always
a uniting of opposites in the unity of intuition.
Marx then asks whether intellectual intuition can provide the
necessity requisite for system, whether there is a logical impossibility
of moving from the Absolute to the finite. He denies these contentions,
for at the heart of the concept of intellectual intuition is the idea of a
spontaneous productivity, one which, though its workings be preconscious, heads teleologically toward a fully conscious selfrecognition. The System portrays the hierarchy of the acts constitutive
of reason as a history of self-consciousness and brilliantly solves the
problem of the basic duplicity of the Self in making the final stage
aesthetic intuition, the perfect union of unconscious activity and
conscious recognition.
It is Marx's defense of the importance of aesthetic intuition as
the final and definitive form of intellectual intuition that distinguishes
his interpretation of the System and allows him to oppose it to an
Hegelian position. To maintain this interpretation, Marx must dismiss
certain quasi-Hegelian misunderstandings of the System, some of
which Schelling himself authored in his 1827 Lectures on the History of
Modern Philosophy. He argues (1) that though Schelling distinguishes
the philosophizing "we" from the self "for-itself," the distinction is not
the motor of the system's development, but merely a rhetorical
device. (2) Unlike the Phenomenology, the System is neither a
Biidungsgeschichte nor a recollection of itself on the part of selfconsciousness nor is it (as Schelling himself claimed in 1827) the work
of consciousness coming to itself. (3) It is unnecessary that there be a
structure of negative self-relation inside consciousness in order to
provide a system principle. For inbuilt into the concept of intellectual
intuition is the idea of third power or activity which mediates between
the opposed activities constitutive of consciousness, that now switches
from one pole to the other but remains essentially free between them,
viz. imagination. If indeed Einbildungskraft lies at the heart of
Schelling's notion of the productivity of reason, then the system is
adequately founded on self-intuition. The 1800 System, claims Marx, is
adequate precisely as an aesthetic reconstruction of the acts
constitutive of consciousness.
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Marx then discusses the basic differences between Hegel's
Phenomenology and the 1800 System. (1) Hegel maintains that
'reflection,' reason's negative self-relation, is the natural form of
consciousness, while Schelling had maintained that intellectual
intuition was pre-reflexive and hidden from the workings of ordinary
consciousness — a profound difference and one that definitively marks
the two works off from one another. (2) The Phenomenology is truly a
history of consciousness, while the System is but an apparent history,
a presentation of the one synthesis constitutive of the finite rational
self as a succession of discrete acts. (3) Hegel's work is genuinely
phenomenological; it pivots around the concept of experience and the
process consciousness undergoes in coming to itself. Schelling's
sytem, by contrast, not only culminates in aesthetic intuition, but as a
whole is an aesthetic construction — a freely undertaken
reconstruction of the Self's original work of freedom. (4) For Hegel the
law of progress for the system is experience or the appearance of
knowledge coming to itself, while for Schelling the system's unfolding
is determined by the Absolutes self-objectification in determined
stages or "potencies."
Marx concludes this essay with a discussion of criticisms brought
against the adequacy of intellectual intuition by partisans of Schelling
and Hegel alike. Indeed, in attempting to defend the cogency of
intellectual intuition and in refusing to cede the place of honor to
Hegelian reflection, Marx shows much sympathy for the metaphysical'
element in the young Schelling's thought and the theologicalmetaphysical tradition from which it stems.
In his third essay, "Die Aufgabe der Freiheitsschrift Schellings,"
Marx focuses upon the major category-revision Schelling's thought
underwent when, under the influence both of theosophical writers and
of the Neoplatonic tradition, he returned to his central theme, human
freedom.
Marx notes that from Parmenides onward, the history of
metaphysics has centered around the identity of thought and being.
The 1800 System stands inside this tradition, for it must ultimately
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posit a coincidence of freedom and necessity, or their metaphysical
identity, beyond the boundaries of our experience. In Marx's eyes, it is
the achievement of Schelling's identity-philosophy (1801-1806) to
come to recognize the incongruence of that identity with human
freedom. The identity-philosophy generally conceives human freedom
as connected to and absorbed into the freedom of the Absolute , i.e.
into its all-encompassing productivity. But as early as 1802, Schelling
begins to break away from the Spinozistic engulfment of the particular
by the Absolute and to edge toward a more vivid sense of human
freedom. The problem of the particularity of the existent individual, its
division from the Absolute, the factical character of finite existence —
all of these build tensions within the identity-philosophy and finally
motivate its abandonment. In the 1809 freedom-essay Schelling
comes to the significant realization that if human freedom is to have a
real and not merely a formal sense, it must be given an ethical and an
ethical-political interpretation. Freedom is now seen concretely to be
the possibility of good and evil. The tensions which had earlier rent the
identity-philosophy, combined with the problem of evil, move Schelling
to undertake a total reinterpretation of the concept of freedom.
Marx correctly acknowledges that the center of the 1809 Essay
is not the notion of human freedom, but that of the Absolute. Schelling
in no way abandoned his goal of systematic philosophy in the years
1809-1815, but the Absolute or system-principle is now grasped in
such a way that it becomes the ground of explanation for human
freedom and ethical activity. Thus Schelling comes to reinterpret the
static logical-metaphysical identity of his earlier thought in moral
terms. The Absolute is primarily conceived in terms of 'life' — as a
process of development through conflict, as an organic process that
results in personality, freedom and ethical actuality.
The 1809 Essay explains the evolution, or better, the
personalization of God as a process which moves between two poles.
At one end — and Marx insists this is just a limiting concept — there is
a static primal unity, the 'Unground.' At the other end is the
achievement of personality, the full realization of will. It is God's
essence to go out of primal, self-contained unity, thus to differentiate
himself from his origin and to move toward the fully articulated and
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harmonized unity of conflicting principles which Schelling calls
'personality.'
The Unground, or 'God' as pure unity, pure being is but a
limiting concept; the real Absolute is properly conceived as will. As will
or self-affirming being, God is seen to contain two conflicting
principles, called 'ground' and 'existence.' Each of these principles is
voluntary; the life of the former is conceived as desire and (its moral
counterpart) self-will, while the life of the latter is conceived as
representation and (its moral counterpart) the will to self-revelation or
communication. Each of these principles has an independent life; the
properly personal God emerges from their conflict and interplay, i.e.
he becomes their identity. This process of achieving full personality
necessitates the creation of the finite realms of nature and of spirit, for
only by letting the Ground go free and attain real independence can its
longing for selfhood be satisfied and only by revealing himself to
independent moral beings or persons can Existence's will-to-love be
satisfied.
Thus Schelling pictures the developed Godhead as a personal
God standing over against an independent world, a world which is the
work of his freedom, his self-development. Marx observes that in 1809
Schelling attributes to the Absolute the kind of freedom that fits with a
conscious and moral being. In this new kind of freedom, Marx
distinguishes three separate moments: (1) freedom as ability to begin,
as spontaneity or productivity (as in the 1800 System); (2) freedom as
a voluntary binding of oneself to a necessity, self-determination or
Spinozistic freedom; and (3) the freedom Kant had ascribed to the
pure will, viz. autonomy or 'personality.'
Schelling derives his account of human freedom from the
structure pf the Absolute's. God's freedom, at its fullest, consists in a
perfect, indissoluble union of the contradictory principles or 'wills.,' In
human freedom or personality, these same principles are bound
together in a finite and dissoluble way, so that human freedom is
properly characterized as the power to decide for good and evil. Since
in man the natural or self-enclosing principle may or may not be
subordinated to the spiritual or other-affirming principle, moral
goodness is seen to mean the affirmation and endorsement of the
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proper order of being, while moral evil overturns that order in allowing
the natural principle to attain to independence.
When Schelling contends that human freedom is the power to
decide for good and for evil, he returns to his theme of the
intertwining of necessity and freedom. Freedom never means arbitrary
choice or caprice for him. He will claim, indeed, that "man is his own
deed," but only in the sense that the one and definitive exercise of his
freedom lies outside of time and consists in a 'choice of character.' The
apparent freedom of an individual act is determined by the necessity
of character, but this character is itself determined by a transcendental
act of choice, a decision — much like Sartre's 'project' of Er's vision of
the soul's choice of its fate.
Marx concludes this essay by emphasizing the central role of the
concept of life in the Freiheitsschrift. It provides the same motor for
Schelling's 'system of freedom' as negativity provides for Hegel's
system, that is, it constitutes the inner self-movement which posits
itself in difference and contradiction in order to recover itself as fully
articulated identity. It is the achievement of the freedom-essay, claims
Marx, that Schelling conceptualizes the mutual limitation of human and
divine freedom as well as their integration. As such, the work attempts
to philosophically actualize the ethical, i.e. to make the ethical the
foundation for the whole system of philosophy.
Marx' essays are well-written and readily intelligible, and they
frequently furnish valuable interpretive insights on Schelling's thought.
This reviewer finds particularly informative the comparisons between
Schelling's and Hegel's concepts and methods. Marx seems willing to
criticize the teleological prejudice to which historians of philosophy
have often fallen prey and to view Hegel and Schelling as co-workers
striving to fulfill the cultural and spiritual calling of philosophy in their
age, "die Aufhebung der Entzweiung."
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